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This paper investigates the extent to which the Madiun Uprising of 1948 
shaped the Cold War in Indonesia. The uprising resulted in severe and 
lasting antagonisms between the Indonesian Communist Party and 
members of the Islamic Party Masyumi due to reprisals against 
Masyumi members after the failure of the uprising and the death of key 
members of the Communist Party at the hands of the Republic. Although 
1948 can be seen as an important flash point in the Cold War for 
Indonesia, it was not a significant turning point because the communist 
party recovered from this episode. After surveying a range of 
interpretations of the Madiun uprising and its significance 
internationally, this paper provides an overview of the ongoing 
significance of the Madiun uprising to the image of the Indonesian 
Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s. The paper examines an early 
history war between the Communist Party and Masyumi over how the 
events at Madiun would be remembered. These debates signal 
continuing and intense hostility towards the communist party from 
Masyumi supporters, which endured throughout and even after the 
1965–1966 anti-communist killings.  
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There are numerous accounts of the 1948 Madiun uprising, but few 
scholars have pondered the extent to which this uprising shaped the Cold 
War in Indonesia. In this paper, I will argue that while 1948 can be seen 
as an important flash point in the Cold War for Indonesia, it was not a 
significant turning point. I will review scholarly opinion on what 
happened in 1948 and assess different accounts and views of the roles 
played by both internal and external players. I will highlight continuing 
debate about interpretations of this period, including the extreme view 
that this was a provocation supported by the US or a Soviet-directed plot 
whereby the Indonesia Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
[PKI]) would seize control of the Republic of Indonesia. The Madiun 
uprising has been variously termed the Madiun Affair, the Madiun 
Revolt or the Madiun Provocation depending on the writer’s 
interpretation of this event. In this paper I use the term uprising to try to 
convey a more neutral view of these events, but I shall also note the 
terminology used by various authors and political players. Finally I will 
provide an overview of the ongoing significance of the Madiun uprising 
to the image of the Indonesian Communist Party and to continuing 
hostility towards the party.  
 
Throughout the course of the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch, 
splits developed between both the communists and the socialists. One 
split was that between nationalist communists such as Tan Malaka and 
so-called Stalinists, with the latter being more open to negotiations with 
the Dutch. Another split was that between left and right socialists 
represented by Amir Sjarifuddin on the left and Sjahrir on the right. In 
1948, leftist socialist influence in the Cabinet was greatly reduced due to 
disagreement over Sjarifuddin’s decision to support the Renville 
Agreement with the Dutch. The Renville Agreement allowed the Dutch 
to retain all areas that they had reclaimed from the Republic by 1947 
(the areas within the van Mook Line encompassing two thirds of Java) 
and to hold plebiscites under United Nations supervision to determine 
which parts were in the Republic or the United States of Indonesia, an 
independent state favoured by the Dutch.  
 
To the displeasure of many, Amir Sjarifuddin, then Minister of Defence 
and Prime Minister, signed the Renville Agreement. He subsequently 
resigned, and the Left Wing (Sayap Kiri) was ousted from its position of 
national leadership. The new cabinet, appointed by Vice President 
Mohammad Hatta, was dominated by members of the Masyumi party; 
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due to their shared hostility toward the left wing, they set about 
rationalising the army, targeting left-leaning troops previously supported 
by Sjarifuddin. Sjarifuddin joined together with the PKI, the armed 
youth organisation, the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo), the Labour 
Party, and Stalinists in the Socialist Party to form the Front Demokrasi 
Rakyat (People’s Democratic Front, hereafter FDR). They tried to secure 
a new cabinet with representation during the following months.  
 
Following a takeover of the local government in Madiun led by Pesindo 
members on 18 September 1948, executed without the knowledge of the 
PKI leadership but subsequently backed by them, the Republic moved 
forward with assurances from the US of greater support for the cause of 
independence, to crush the communists by killing the key leaders, 
Sjarifuddin and Musso. As the rebels fled Republican troops, they killed 
many teachers, officials and religious leaders who were members of 
Masyumi. President Sukarno condemned the plotters and the 
communists, declaring them traitors to the Republic. PKI leader Musso 
responded by saying that Hatta and Sukarno had betrayed the revolution. 
A few months prior to the Madiun Uprising, Musso had returned from a 
long period in the Soviet Union with a new plan for Indonesian 
communists. This created speculation that the Soviet Union was directly 
involved in the Madiun Uprising. The Republican army then executed 
key communist leaders and thousands of followers. 
 
 
SCHOLARSHIP ON THE 1948 MADIUN UPRISING 
 
There is considerable scholarship on the events of 1948 in Indonesia. 
Some analyses of the period are provided in larger studies of the 
dynamics of the 1945–1949 Indonesian revolution against the Dutch.
2 
                                                 
2   George  Kahin,  Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1952 (1970): Anthony Reid, 
Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1950, Longman, 1974, 128–148, 
Several key studies of the revolution such as those of Benedict Anderson 
and Anton Lucas, however, end before 1948 and hence do not discuss 
Madiun. Benedict Anderson, The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian politics, 
1945–1946, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968 and Anton 
Lucas,  One Soul One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia, 
Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen 
and Unwin, 1991. 
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Different perspectives are also provided in studies of the international 
dimensions of the revolution, especially Dutch, American and Soviet 
positions on and responses to the revolution.
3 In addition to these larger-
picture studies, there have also been several more focused studies on the 
events of 1948 and in particular on the Madiun Uprising.
4 These studies 
emphasise different aspects of the Uprising, including the question of the 
extent to which it was an internal military affair or an attempted coup 
against the Republic and the degree of influence of international factors 
on the revolt and the response to it.  
 
A pioneering scholarly discussion of the 1948 events is provided in 
Cornell University scholar George Kahin’s 1952 publication 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.
5 Kahin was physically present 
in the republic at this time, and he draws upon multiple local 
publications and discussions with key players to reconstruct the 1948 
Madiun events. He charts the negative influence of the Dutch blockade 
and the newly agreed-upon border of the Republic (the van Mook line), 
which exacerbated economic conditions.
6 He does not reflect in great 
depth upon the impact of the cabinet reshuffling following Sjarifuddin’s 
resignation in fuelling resentment amongst the left. In the two previous 
cabinets, for example, key leaders in the newly formed PKI had held 
significant ministerial positions, whereas they were excluded from the 
                                                 
3   Alan Levine, The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia 1945–
1975, Prager, Westport, 1995. Robert McMahon, Colonialism and the Cold 
War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 
1945–1949, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1981. Paul F. 
Gardner,  Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of US-Indonesian 
Relations, Westview Press, 1997. Frances Gouda, with Thijs Brocades 
Zaalberg, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US 
Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949, Amsterdam 
University Press, Amsterdam, 2002. Ruth McVey, The Soviet View of the 
Indonesian Revolution, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957 (third printing 
1969).  
4   Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun, The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 
1948, Cornell Modern Indonesia Program, Monograph Series No. 69, 
Ithaca, New York, 1989: David Charles Anderson, “The Military Aspects 
of the Madiun Affair”, Indonesia, 1976; Soe Hok Gie, Orang Orang di 
Persimpangan Kiri Jalan, Bentang, Jakarta, 1997. 
5   George  Kahin,  Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1952 (1970). 
6   Ibid., 250–253. 
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new Hatta cabinet. He also writes as if the left exploited Hatta’s military 
rationalisation plans
7 rather than having felt genuine upset at being the 
target of the Hatta government. Kahin argues, based on a document 
dated July 1948 (entitled Mengindjak Tingkatan Perdjuangan Militer 
Baru or Entering the New Stage of a Military Struggle), that although 
the events in Madiun represented a premature act of rebellion that was 
not authorised by the party, there were plans for using non-parliamentary 
means to seize power once parliamentary means had been exhausted.
8 
He claims that the Republic became aware of this and for this reason 
moved against FDR supporters, targeting them for rationalisation in the 
events leading up to the Madiun Uprising.  
 
Kahin outlines links between events in Solo, where the Republic was 
targeting the 4
th battalion for rationalisation, and events in Madiun. In 
Solo, a series of murders and kidnappings of members the 4
th battalion 
led to a showdown between the largely Pesindo and naval forces in this 
battalion and the Siliwangi troops and communist nationalist troops in 
the Barisan Benteng. Kahin suggests that the Pesindo forces in Madiun 
felt increasingly threatened by the next steps towards rationalisation. He 
claims they were faced with two choices: either allow themselves to be 
taken over by republican forces or take over the Republican 
administration in the regency, where the FDR already dominated.
9
 
Kahin clearly states that the PKI did not formally plan the actions in 
Madiun. Musso was at the time in the middle of a speaking engagement 
with Sjarifuddin. Other PKI leaders were in Yogyakarta. According to 
Kahin, the leaders had little choice but to go along with the revolt, 
especially once Sukarno made his 19 September speech in which he 
claimed that the Communist Party of Musso had staged a coup in 
Madiun. In this speech, Sukarno linked the events in Solo with Madiun 
and called on the people to choose between Musso and the Communist 
Party or Soekarno-Hatta.
10  
 
 
                                                 
7   Ibid., 262–266. 
8   Ibid., 269. 
9   Ibid., 287–924. 
10   Ibid., 286. 
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Kahin records the campaign of suppression of the PKI in a matter-of-fact 
way, but he reports with concern that as they were fleeing Republican 
troops, communist units became increasingly brutal, killing civil 
servants, school teachers, and policemen and targeting Masyumi 
members in particular.
11 Kahin speculates that the killing of several 
hundred people was either the result of anti-Masyumi indoctrination by 
the FDR or ordered by FDR leaders.
12 In the foreword to the updated 
version of this book, published in 1970, Kahin responds to comments 
that he represented the socialist leaders from the Indonesian Socialist 
Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) and Masyumi in very favourable 
terms in this work, as opposed to communist leaders such as Tan 
Malaka, and justifies this on the basis of his having less access to some 
leftist leaders. This is an important acknowledgement given how 
influential this work has been to all future studies of Madiun and 
especially given both the PSI’s and Masyumi’s hostility towards the 
PKI. Kahin is definitely pro-Republican in his views and unsympathetic 
to the communists. 
 
Kahin’s work was the first scholarly account of Madiun, and most other 
scholarly accounts were written after 1965. The year 1965 was a critical 
turning point in Indonesian history because of the attempted coup in 
which six senior army men were kidnapped and killed, which the army 
immediately blamed on the Communist Party. In Indonesia the events of 
1965 were immediately tied to the events of 1948 to highlight the 
allegedly treasonous nature of the Communist Party.  
 
Soe Hok Gie was a prominent student activist in the 1960s who 
protested against the Sukarno government and following the attempted 
coup joined in on protests to ban the PKI. Gie, however, became quickly 
disillusioned by the Suharto regime and was one of the few Indonesians 
to publicly raise concerns about the hundreds of thousands of 
Indonesians who were killed or imprisoned following the attempt.
13 It 
was against this backdrop that Soe wrote one of the most balanced 
accounts of Madiun in the form of a Master’s thesis in history at the 
                                                 
11   Ibid., 300. 
12   Ibid., 305–306. 
13   For more on Soe Hok Gie see John Maxwell, “Soe Hok Gie: A Biography 
of a Young Intellectual”, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1997. 
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University of Indonesia, completed in 1969.
14 In this work, which was 
not published in Indonesia until 1997, Soe argues that the key to 
understanding the Madiun Uprising is in the context of those times 
political, social (changes wrought in society after 1942) and economic 
(economic destruction and reconstruction in the post-war period).
15 
Factors such as clashes between Islamic and nationalist and between 
Sundanese  and Javanese people also played a role. In his view, the 
tensions surrounding the Indonesian revolution, the high level of 
radicalism as a result of the times, and the thwarted hopes and 
unfulfilled expectations of independence all contributed to the outbreak 
of the Madiun Affair.  
 
Shortly after the 1965 coup attempt, three researchers — Ruth McVey, 
Frederick Bunnell and Benedict Anderson — began working on a theory 
concerning it. They had originally intended their work to remain 
confidential. The contents of the paper became known, however, after 
the publication of an article by Joseph Kraft in the Washington Post, in 
which a summary of the findings in this paper were referred to as 
coming from a paper prepared by Cornell staff.
16 The Cornell Paper, as 
it became known, concluded that the coup attempt was more likely the 
result of severe intra-army conflicts. This prompted the Indonesian army 
to produce an English-language defence of the military’s version of the 
coup attempt.
17 One possible effect of the Cornell Paper was to cast 
doubt on the most popular interpretation inside Indonesia of Madiun as a 
PKI revolt. At the same time there was concern, at least amongst some 
scholars, regarding the brutal treatment of many Indonesians affiliated 
with the communist party in 1965–1966. This sympathy and the Cornell 
                                                 
14    This thesis was, interestingly, supervised by the key military historian 
Nugroho Notosusanto. 
15   Soe Hok Gie, Orang-orang di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan, Bentang, Jakarta, 
1997, 273–274. 
16   The original title of the work was “A Preliminary Analysis of the 1 October 
1965 Coup in Indonesia”. Because this document became the centre of a 
controversy, the researchers decided in 1971 to publish the original version 
with some added revisions and clarifications about this text’s production. 
Benedict Anderson, “Scholarship on Indonesia and Raison D’État: 
Personal Experience”, Indonesia, no. 62 (October 1996): 2, 5. 
17   See Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform Military Ideology and the 
Construction of the Indonesian Past, Singapore University Press, 2007,   
65–68. 
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theory on the 1965 coup may also have influenced scholarly works on 
Madiun. 
 
In 1976, just five years after this version of the 1965 coup attempt was 
published, David Anderson published a detailed article in the Cornell-
based journal Indonesia focusing on the military dimensions of the 
Madiun Uprising. Perhaps also suspicious of orthodox Indonesian views 
of the Madiun Uprising, Anderson refers to this as the Madiun Affair, 
following the Indonesian Communist Party’s preferred terminology. He 
focuses particularly on the responses of lasykar and other military units 
in East and Central Java in 1948 to Hatta’s dramatic plans for the 
reorganisation of the military.
18 Drawing on military records and 
publications and diverse local newspapers, Anderson argues that the 
Madiun Affair is best understood as “an internal crisis of military 
politics, and not, as is so often portrayed in accounts from the national 
and international standpoint, as an unsuccessful leftist bid for all out 
revolution in Indonesia.”
19 Anderson thus suggests that Madiun, 1948 
was not a major turning point in the Cold War in Indonesia.  
 
Anderson is clearly more sympathetic than Kahin towards those who 
acted on 18 September 1948 to take control of the local government. For 
Anderson the key to understanding the Madiun Affair lies within the 
territory of the Republic and the impact of Hatta’s reorganisation 
campaign on military and other local rivalries. Like Soe, he also 
highlights ethnic tensions, introduced by the retreat of the largely 
Sundanese Siliwangi troops to the shrunken confines of the Republic, as 
contributing to the revolt combined with a perception that they were 
privileged in the reorganisation effort.
20 He comments on the resentment 
in Solo after the murder of 4
th battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel 
Sutarto and the kidnapping of other military leaders, leading to the 
ultimatum by Republican military officer Gatot Subroto that members of 
the 4
th battalion surrender or be branded traitors.  
 
Anderson reminds us that Madiun was significant at this time because it 
was the third largest city under Republican control  after Yogyakarta and 
                                                 
18   David Anderson, Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair, Indonesia, 1976, 
Vol. 21, pp. 2–9. 
19   Ibid., 53. 
20   Ibid., 2. 
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Solo. Here there had been a recent shift from widespread support for 
socialism to some gains for Masyumi and the national communists 
(represented by Tan Malaka).
21 Pesindo as an armed youth organisation 
and the police units felt more threatened by Hatta’s plans to make 
Madiun a military capital for East Java. Here they also openly 
condemned the proposed military reforms. They feared they would 
eventually lose their positions after being gradually phased out.
22 There 
were already reports of repression of leftist troops near Blitar, southeast 
of Madiun, in East Java.  
 
Like Kahin, Anderson suggests that the Pesindo forces in Madiun felt 
increasingly threatened by rationalisation.
23 He notes that once the revolt 
led by Pesindo leaders had taken place, the PKI leaders made an offer to 
the Republic to contain the revolt if they were allowed to return to the 
cabinet, but this was rejected. This last point is not frequently mentioned 
and it adds greater weight to the theory that this was not a PKI-planned 
revolt.
24 The PKI’s backing of this revolt in the end is, however, 
significant because the PKI became associated with this event thereafter. 
 
In the most comprehensive study of the Madiun uprising published in 
1989, Ann Swift puts forward the theory that the Madiun Affair was the 
product of mutual suspicion and anticipation from each side that the 
other would soon move against it.
25 Swift draws on an impressive array 
of Indonesian newspaper reports from the period and other primary 
accounts by Indonesians. She charts in detail the role of the politicised 
military, Indonesia’s place in the world, the impact of cabinet changes 
preceding Madiun and the programmes of the FDR concerning labour 
and farmers in shaping the events in Madiun. 
 
Swift comments that it is difficult to judge the authenticity of the 
documents quoted by George Kahin concerning the PKI’s plans to take 
over the republic by force in November 1948, to which he was given 
                                                 
21   Ibid., 20–21. 
22   Ibid., 22. 
23   Ibid., 25. 
24   Van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 35. 
25   Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 
1948, Cornell Modern Indonesia Program, Monograph Series No. 69, 
Ithaca, New York, 1989. 
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access during the revolution. Sukarno had also used forged documents 
from the communist nationalist party Murba in his radio address of 
September 19th concerning Madiun. She suggests that the Entering the 
New Stage of a Military Struggle document, which was supposed to be 
written in July, follows the events of September too closely to be 
believed, including specific plans, for example, for creating a “wild 
west”-like atmosphere in Madiun. She argues it is impossible to say 
definitively whether the PKI was planning to take over the government 
by force or by legal means.
26 Mortimer offered a similar criticism of 
Kahin, suggesting that his account of Madiun accepted the government 
version too much at face value.
27 Significantly, however, these 
documents were widely disseminated at the time of Madiun so as to 
spread the view that this was a planned communist revolt.
28 In Indonesia 
after the 1965 coup attempt, this also became accepted as the definitive 
history of Madiun. 
 
One surviving leader of the Madiun uprising from the FDR gave an 
account to the Dutch in 1949 of his role and many years later also gave a 
similar verbal account. These two versions of Madiun provided by 
Sumarsono, who became military governor of Madiun under the rebel 
government, have been the subject of a Master’s thesis by Akiko 
Sugiyama.
29 In these accounts Sumarsono, provided information similar 
to that described by Anderson, of FDR members in Madiun feeling as if 
they were being closed in upon. He asserts the idea that the Madiun 
actions constituted self-defence following the events in Solo and fears 
                                                 
26   Swift, The Road to Madiun, 89–90. 
27   Rex  Mortimer,  Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and 
Politics 1959–1965, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1974, 
38, footnote 19. 
28    See, for example, “Rentjana-Rentjana Moeso”, Trompet Masyarakat, 1 
October 1948. On these propaganda efforts see also Swift, The Road to 
Madiun, 88–89. 
29   Akiko Sugiyama, Indonesia’s Madiun Affair of 1948: Two Accounts by 
Sumarsono, Masters Thesis, Ohio University, 2002. This thesis includes 
translations of Sumarsono’s 1949 account provided under interrogation by 
the Dutch, entitled de Madioen Affaire, 11 November 1949 (unpublished 
document from Algemeen Rijksarchief: Tweede Afdeling Procureur-
General bih het Hooggerechtshof in Nedelands-Indie 1945–1950, Nr 595, 
Jakarta, 11 November 1949) and two interviews with him in 1998 and 2000 
by Kusalah Subagyo Tur.  
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that rationalisation was about to commence in Madiun with the arrival of 
Siliwangi forces.
30 Contrary to most analyses, he claims in his 1949 
account that he was instructed by the FDR executive (including Musso 
and Sjarifuddin) to disarm the police and Siliwangi units before they 
themselves were targeted.
31 In a more recent account of Madiun, Harry 
Poeze relies on Sumarsono’s testimony and reports from an Antara 
newspaper photographer that two Politburo members Wikana and 
Setiadjit had left Musso’s speaking tour for Madiun prior to the 
uprising.
32 Although Poeze is convinced that this proves the hand of the 
PKI in the uprising, the Antara report was filed after the event and thus 
is also possibly biased towards supporting the Republic’s version of 
events. Sugiyama notes inconsistencies between the two accounts of 
Madiun given by Sumarsono in 1949 and in interviews in 1998 and 
2000. In both accounts, however, Sumarsono claims that he acted on the 
instructions of the FDR and not, as Swift and Kahin claim,
33 
independently. As Sugiyama notes, Sumarsono’s account is motivated 
more by self-interest and a desire to absolve himself of responsibility 
than by his political allegiances. Many questions thus remain about 
Madiun and due to the problem of biased sources, it is difficult to reach 
a definitive conclusion.
34 Many questions thus remain about Madiun and 
due to the problem of biased sources, it is difficult to reach a definitive 
conclusion. 
  
The Role of the US and the Soviet Union in the Madiun Uprising 
 
Despite the relatively depoliticised account by Sumarsono, Swift notes 
that since the Madiun Affair, interpretations of this episode have often 
been influenced by Cold War politics and fallen into two extreme 
interpretational camps regarding the episode. One interpretation, given 
                                                 
30   References to Sumarsono’s views in this paragraph and the next are based 
on the translation of Sumarsono’s 1949 account provided by Akiko 
Sugiyama,  Indonesia’s Madiun Affair of 1948: Two Accounts by 
Sumarsono, Masters Thesis, Ohio University, 2002, 21–57. 
31   Sugiyama, Indonesia’s Madiun Affair of 1948, 31. 
32   Harry Poeze, “The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948”. Paper presented at the 
Roundtable on the Sixtieth Anniversary of 1948: Reassessing the Origins 
of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 10–11 July 2008, Asia Research 
Institute. 
33   Swift, 90; and Kahin, 290–291. 
34   Sugiyama, Indonesia’s Madiun Affair of 1948, 117–120. 
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little weight, was that this was an American provocation aimed at getting 
the government of the Republic to suppress leftist opposition in return 
for diplomatic support.
35 The second was that it was a Soviet plot in 
which the Russians sent the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, 
Musso, back from Moscow to radicalise the party in line with Stalinism 
and to overthrow the government.
36  
 
In her account, Swift claims that the US was not deeply involved in 
Indonesian domestic matters at that time, despite maintaining its concern 
about the need to guard against a communist government.
37 In 
Nationalism and Revolution, Kahin devotes very little attention to 
American views of Madiun and relations between Hatta and the 
Americans. For Kahin, Musso’s return to Indonesia was evidence of 
Soviet interest in directing events in Indonesia, although he does not 
state that Musso acted on behalf of the Russians. He also suggests that 
the Calcutta Youth Conference, which several lower-level PKI leaders 
attended, introduced an awareness of the new Zhdanov line by which the 
Soviets now advocated the division of the world into two blocs: the 
“aggressive capitalist” bloc led by the US and the “democratic bloc” led 
by Russia.
38 Kahin also charts the influence of the Suripno affair on the 
view that Hatta was pro-US. Suripno was sent to Eastern Europe by the 
Republic to garner support for the Republic. In January 1948 he 
achieved an agreement with Prague, but the Republic under Sjarifuddin 
and then Hatta did not want to jeopardise negotiations with the Dutch. 
Prague went on to say the Russian government had agreed, but the 
Republic’s response was to withdraw Suripno. 
 
Overall, Kahin’s analysis concentrates on charting the path towards 
independence rather than mapping out how the Cold War was playing 
out in Indonesia. In a much later piece, however, Kahin suggests that the 
US’s role in reneging on the Renville Agreement by giving aid to the 
Netherlands (which was used to fund weapons in Indonesia and seize 
further territory) was so significant that without it there might not have 
                                                 
35   Swift, The Road to Madiun, 81–87. 
36   Ibid., 81–91. 
37   Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 84–86. 
38   Ibid., 257. 
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been a Madiun rebellion.
39 He argues that the US’s position regarding 
Renville resulted in a real shift of support towards Moscow.  
 
In a comprehensive study of American responses to and intervention in 
the process of Indonesian decolonisation from 1920–1949, Gouda and 
Zaalberg argue that the Dutch tried very hard to play up the threat of the 
Republic’s falling to communism to the US State Department. The 
Americans were also concerned about communism in Indonesia, but in 
contrast to the Dutch, they eventually came to the conclusion that an 
independent state, versus one ruled by foreigners, was a better safeguard 
against communism.
40
 
By 1948 the US had for some time been watching the growing split 
between communists and non-communists in Indonesia. They were 
aware that the differences were becoming irreconcilable. According to 
Gouda and Zaalberg, the Suripno Affair also contributed to this split. 
Gouda writes that the FDR continued to push for Soviet recognition of 
the Republic’s autonomy despite Hatta’s recalling Suripno from 
Prague.
41 Gouda describes ex-Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin as 
having tried to consolidate and expand left-wing control over the armed 
forces at the same time Hatta was rationalising the TNI. As both Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence, Hatta tried to reduce the TNI to 
160,000 armed troops from 463,000 troops.
42 Hatta became increasingly 
reliant on Sudirman and also Siliwangi troops under Nasution and on the 
elite Police Mobile Brigade.  
 
Soon after the FDR merged into the Communist Party and when 
Sjarifuddin declared himself a communist, US Naval Intelligence 
reported that they perceived Indonesians had lost faith in the UN and 
expected guerrilla warfare soon, which would be met with Dutch 
repression. In their view, this would lead to further support for 
communism in the Republic because it would allow Musso to categorise 
                                                 
39   George Kahin, “Some Recollections From and Reflections on the 
Indonesian Revolution”, in Taufik Abdullah, The Heartbeat of the 
Indonesian Revolution, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1997, 15. 
40   Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 272. 
41   Ibid., 273–274. 
42   Ibid., 274. 
97 Katharine McGregor 
the Republic and the Netherlands Army as part of the same US camp.
43 
Because of US pressure the Dutch refrained from military action at this 
point. Rumours about Soviet support were rampant and backed up by the 
Dutch, who were still hoping for a change in position on the part of the 
US. Hatta was fearful of Soviet arms assistance. 
 
At this point Hatta wanted to know if the Truman Administration would 
provide assistance to the Republic in its battle against communism. On 
September 9
th, Merle Cochran, the American representative to the UN’s 
Committee of Good Offices was given permission from State Secretary 
Marshal to inform Hatta that the US government “would in every way 
practical assist the democratic non-communist government of Indonesia 
successfully resist communist tyranny”, including offering financial help 
for a peaceful federation and pushing through the Cochran plan as 
quickly as possible.
44 In contrast to Swift, who claims that there is no 
weight to the US provocation theory, Gouda’s analysis suggests at the 
very least that assurances from the US played a role in shaping the 
Republic’s response to communist resistance to rationalization. 
Assurances of US support made Hatta respond more firmly. 
 
Gouda notes that Hatta accused Musso of attempting to drag Indonesia 
into the Soviet-American global conflict. Hatta openly proclaimed that 
the future of Indonesia did not rest with the Soviets.
45 Washington was 
watching Indonesia very closely at this point because of developments 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Gouda notes that on 20 September, Merle 
Cochran met Hatta in Kaliurang and extended his appreciation for 
Hatta’s role in crushing the communists. Hatta requested arms to 
continue this process.
46 On the surface, Hatta appeared to continue to 
support neutrality to appease others in the leadership.
47 The US did not 
concede regarding the provision of weapons because of Dutch 
sensitivities, but it did consider training Republican troops.
48 Kahin also 
notes that after the Republic crushed the communists, a CIA agent 
named Arturo Campbell made a week-long visit to the Republic to seek 
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out key Police Mobile Brigade members involved in crushing the revolt 
and suitable for sending to the US for training. This visit was kept very 
secret.
49
 
Gouda also notes that Washington encouraged harsh treatment of 
communists rather than advocating that a settlement be reached with 
them. Merle Cochran was instructed to inform Hatta that firm action 
would be well received in the Western world.
50 Key leaders were indeed 
killed without trial. The US also put pressure on Hatta to deal with Tan 
Malaka and his nationalist independent communist movement.
51 Tan 
Malaka, who attempted a coup against the republican government in 
1946, was released from gaol in 1948 to help provide another source of 
opposition to Musso’s forces. He was shot dead by Republican troops in 
1949.  
 
According to Gouda and Zaalberg, anti-communism thus drove both 
Dutch and US views of the Republic. Gouda notes that the year 1948 
began with the Truman Administration’s fully backing the Netherlands, 
but that by the end of 1948 the US was warning the Netherlands not to 
engage in military action or Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands and 
Dutch East Indies would be jeopardised.
52 They note that the US support 
for the Republic resulted from a desire to “bind the fledgling nation-state 
to their own Cold War strategies”.
53  
 
Although 1948 could be seen as the year the Indonesian government 
chose to side with one camp, Gouda and Zaalberg stress that this was 
largely a pragmatic decision driven by the overall goal of achieving 
independence. They suggest that Hatta’s move away from a policy of 
non-alignment and his decision to crush the communists was a tactic to 
accelerate the process of independence. Shortly thereafter, Indonesia 
returned to non-alignment, and by the 1950s Hatta was sidelined. In 
contrast, Sukarno believed in accommodating the communists.
54 This 
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conclusion should lead to caution in seeing 1948 as a teleological 
turning point. Instead it should be viewed as a flashpoint in the Cold 
War. 
 
From the American perspective, in 1948 the Republic formed closer ties 
with the US and won over their support, but Gouda correctly argues that 
this was not a lasting alliance with the Indonesian government. The 
Madiun uprising did not set the course for an enduring partnership 
between the Indonesian and American governments. I would, however, 
argue that for some sections of Indonesian society, including elements of 
the Indonesian military and certainly Masyumi supporters, the 
experience of Madiun cemented a tradition of anti-communism and thus 
a cause shared with the US. In this way, the events of 1948 contributed 
to an enduring fracture within Indonesia between the left and right, 
which continued to influence the direction of the Cold War in Indonesia. 
I will return to this point later. 
 
In her 1957 study of Soviet views of the Indonesian revolution, McVey 
notes that although the FDR openly declared that it sided with the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Union was slow to back the Madiun revolt.
55 It 
eventually viewed Madiun as a provocation by the Republican 
government in league with the US and took a wary approach towards the 
Hatta government.  
 
Based on documents from the Central Committee of the All Union 
Communist Party (Bolshevik, AUCPB) including writings from Musso 
and correspondence with Dutch Communists (CPN), Efimova argues 
against the view that Musso acted on instructions from Moscow when he 
returned to Indonesia in 1948. Instead she suggests that Musso returned 
to Indonesia primarily to strengthen links between All Union 
Communist Party (Bolshevik AUCPB) and Indonesian communists, a 
move desired by both sides.
56 A second reason was the Soviet Union’s 
frustration with the passing of power from the communists to the 
bourgeois nationalists in Indonesia. They blamed this not only on the US 
and right-wing parties, but also on mistakes by the Indonesian 
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communists, especially their failure to follow the Zhdanov Doctrine with 
regard to the world’s division into two camps.
57 Interestingly, Musso 
tried to defend the actions of the Indonesian communists by suggesting 
that the PKI were trying to paralyse Dutch anti-communist propaganda 
by minimising their outward strength.
58 After the Sjarifuddin 
government fell, however, Musso was subject to much critique for 
defending this, and his decision to return to Indonesia may also have 
been based on a desire to correct the course of Indonesian communists.  
 
Both McVey and Efimova have traced sources of influence on The New 
Road, Musso’s plan for the future direction of Indonesian communism. 
Efimova suggests that Musso was inspired by multiple sources. First of 
all, he was influenced by Soviet communist assessments of Indonesia, 
which laid much blame on the tactics of the PKI and on Sjarifuddin for 
signing the Renville Agreement.
59 The Soviets critiqued the rejection of 
the armed struggle with the Netherlands, transferring state power to 
nationalists, co-operating with rightist parties and keeping a distance 
from the USSR with no open declaration about the Soviet camp.
60 
McVey and Efimova both also note that Musso was inspired by the 
Chinese communist experience and Maoist thought. The Chinese had 
created a national front with representatives of layers of working people 
including the bourgeoisie, and this was a key idea outlined in the New 
Road.
61 Lastly, Musso was influenced by Dutch communist thinking. 
 Musso’s plans outlined in the New Road were acted upon soon after he 
returned to Indonesia in 1948 and were thus critical to shaping the 
direction of the Indonesian left. Efimova, however, stresses the 
independence of Musso and Suripno in representing the needs of 
Indonesian communists and points to departures from both Soviet views 
and those of Dutch communists in Musso’s plans.
62 She thus concludes 
that Musso was not a Soviet agent or acting on behalf of the Soviets. She 
also believes that Indonesia remained peripheral to Stalin’s interests. 
                                                 
57   Ibid., 174. 
58   Ibid., 175. 
59   The Assessment was entitled, “the situation in Indonesia after the signing 
of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement on 17 January 1948”, Efimova, “Who 
gave instructions to the Indonesian communist Leader Musso in 1948”, 
177. 
60   Ibid., 178. 
61   Ibid., 179, McVey, 62–66. 
62    Ibid., 184–188. 
101 Katharine McGregor 
Along with Anderson’s analysis that Madiun was largely an internal 
military affair and Gouda and Zaalberg’s suggestion that the Republic’s 
decision to court the US was pragmatic, Efimova’s conclusions 
regarding the independence of Indonesian communists at this time and 
her emphasis on a unique model for action in Indonesia suggest that in 
1948, as the Cold War was developing, Indonesians drew different 
sources of inspiration from both sides of the Cold War divide for 
different ends. Combined, these studies reinforce the necessity of 
understanding specific Indonesian responses to the Cold War rather than 
seeing them as puppets within a larger drama. 
 
Lasting Legacies of the Madiun Uprising in Indonesia 
 
Although the events of 1948 were not pivotal in determining Indonesia’s 
position in the Cold War, they had long-lasting effects within Indonesia. 
One aspect of the Madiun uprising that has not received much scholarly 
attention is the enduring significance of the reprisals by FDR troops 
against Masyumi members. On 2 October 1948, the Surabaya-based 
newspaper  Trompet Masyarakat reported a broadcast from Soeara 
Indonesia Merdeka radio that as Republican troops were cleaning up the 
rebels who had attempted to seize power in Madiun (remnants of the 
FDR), the rebels (kaum pengacau) “did not let their prisoners go but 
instead killed tens of people including kiai, school teachers, local 
community leaders and elites”.
63  Trompet Masyarakat claimed that 
Sjarifuddin gave instructions to kill detainees in the Madiun gaol as 
Republican troops were approaching. This plan was thwarted, but an 
article on the same page also reports that in Tirtomojo, South Solo, fifty-
six people were found dead. These included policemen, prominent 
Islamic figures and pamong praja (local government officials).
64 In the 
1950s, Masyumi members repeatedly raised these killings as a way of 
attacking the PKI. Swift also notes, based on an account from 
communist leader Suripno, that these excesses caused many to reject the 
communists.
65
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Estimates of the number of leftist troops killed in the aftermath of 
Madiun are sparse. Fealy suggests that 8,000 people, mostly communist 
troops, lost their lives.
66 Hindley notes that Pesindo claimed to have lost 
1000 members.
67  
 
The PKI was not banned as a result of the Madiun Affair, and some 
leaders escaped persecution. Feith notes that 35,000 people were 
arrested, some only briefly for involvement in Madiun, but that the 
organised power of the Communist Party in both the army and the 
irregular army units was destroyed.
68 Many second-echelon leaders were 
killed in the fighting, and eleven of the most prominent communist 
prisoners, including Sjarifuddin and Suripno, were shot in December 
1948 when the Dutch troops were advancing.
69 Following the second 
Dutch aggression on 18 December 1948, most of the 35,000 prisoners 
were released to help fight against the Dutch and most PKI supporters 
were welcomed back to the revolution. Swift claims that their 
participation in the fight against the Dutch enabled the gradual 
acceptance of a rehabilitated party after independence.
70  
 
The PKI was, however, in a fairly precarious position until the early 
1950s, particularly because of the dominance of Masyumi in all cabinets 
prior to 1953. In Kahin’s study, he states that Masyumi members chose 
to believe that they were deliberately targeted for persecution by the 
FDR under the orders of FDR leaders in the violence following the 
Madiun Affair. Madiun thus served to consolidate the anti-communist 
sentiment of Masyumi. Feith notes this hostility extended to nationalist 
communists (including against Tan Malaka’s forces, who had helped 
suppress the Madiun rebels) and also to non-communist socialists such 
as Sjahrir for a brief time.
71  
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In 1951, under Masyumi Prime Minister Sukiman (April 1951–February 
1952) there were anti-communist raids following strikes and small-scale 
disturbances throughout Indonesia. Rumours spread of another Madiun. 
Many PKI leaders and labour union leaders were arrested, but not Aidit, 
Lukman, Njoto or Alimin.
72 The PKI referred to these sweeps as the 
August Raids and took the opportunity to critique this as evidence of 
creeping fascism in Indonesia.
73 They accused religious groups of 
working in collaboration with FBI agent Campbell. They also linked 
Masyumi with these raids.
74 This was a significant anti-communist 
sweep, as by 29 October, 15,000 people had been arrested. The cabinet 
held some discussions about the legality of this action, but no major 
objections were raised, especially from Masyumi leaders. On the reasons 
for Sukiman’s actions, Feith writes that Sukiman was an anti-communist 
and did not fear setting precedents like this; he saw an opportunity to 
deal with the communists here. Sukiman was also close to Merle 
Cochran, who was anxious to see the strengthening of anti-communism 
in Indonesia, especially given the Korean war and McCarthyism in the 
US.
75 Feith’s observations suggest continuing US intervention in 
Indonesia and add weight to the PKI’s claims.  
 
The August 1951 raids were a major setback for the PKI, from which 
they did not recover until 1953.
76 This made the communists determined 
to oppose the Sukiman government and to seek an alternative 
government from amongst the nationalist bourgeoisie.
77 All this time, 
the PKI was also trying to recover from the damage that the Madiun 
Affair had inflicted upon its name. In addition to this, there were also 
splits within the party over leadership and tactical issues, especially 
between older and younger party members. In 1951, the communist 
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party magazine Bintang Merah provided a long account of what it called 
the “Madiun Provocation”.
78  On the subject of overcoming the stigma 
of Madiun there were, however, divided views within the PKI. Some felt 
they needed to work within other parties first, but Aidit felt loyalty to the 
nationalists would serve them better.
79  
 
The year 1953 marked a turning point for the PKI because they decided 
to adopt a less aggressive position towards the ruling government from 
which they had continually been excluded. The PKI had stood against 
the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets, viewing them as imperialist and 
sometimes fascist. The Wilopo cabinet, which assumed duty in April 
1952, was again to be PNI- and Masyumi-dominated, but the PKI spoke 
out, saying it would accept this as long as it was “progressive and 
national”.
80 From 1953 onwards, the PKI thus decided to court the PNI. 
During the period of the Wilopo cabinet, the PKI became more 
accommodating and developed an improved relationship with the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party, the PNI and Sukarno, who had also felt the 
need to include more radical voices in the government. Discontent with 
the Wilopo Cabinet led to the formation of a new cabinet under the 
leadership of PNI figure Ali Sastroamidjojo.  
 
As the PKI regained ground, interpretations of the Madiun uprising were 
hotly contested in the Indonesian press between supporters of Masyumi 
and the PKI as a way of discrediting either side. On the 7 September 
1953, the socialist paper Pedoman reported that the Organisation for 
Islamic contacts had declared the Madiun Revolt a black page in the 
history of the nation.
81 It accused the PKI of having stolen hundreds of 
thousands of rupiah from the Republic in the revolt and of having killed 
many ulamas and teachers. Furthermore, it called upon the Republic to 
declare 18 September as the National Day of Mourning and to arrest and 
try those behind the revolt. They also called upon all Islamic and non-
communist forces to support these calls and asked all mosques to hold 
religious contemplation services with prayers so that those who died in 
the Madiun Revolt would be received as martyrs.  
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Capitalising on its increased stature, the PKI produced a White Book on 
Madiun 1953 which, similar to the earlier PKI version which appeared 
in Bintang Merah outlined the theory that Madiun was a provocation.
82 
In September 1953 Pedoman accused the PKI of wanting to plant a myth 
that Madiun was a provocation.
83 Tensions were so high that the 
Attorney General issued a ban on any meetings or demonstrations on the 
anniversary of the Madiun Affair.
84 In September 1953, Masyumi 
council member Jusuf Wibisono reminded the public of those who 
fought in the independence struggle and especially Muslims, who find it 
difficult to forget 18 September 1948. He sought to remind the people 
that on this occasion, the people chose Sukarno and Hatta over the PKI 
and Musso.
85 The Masyumi Surabaya branch called for the arrest and 
trial of people involved in Madiun, such as Sukirman.
86 The League of 
Former Islamic Fighters in Yogyakarta continued to campaign for 18 
September to be declared a National Day of Mourning.
87 In October 
there were reported sweepings (forced seizures) of the PKI’s White 
Book in bookshops in Surabaya, the capital city of East Java.
88
 
In September 1954, on the sixth anniversary on the Madiun uprisings, 
Masyumi leader Sjarif Usman called upon Indonesians to remember the 
“Madiun Revolt”.
89 He accused Aidit of falsifying history and also of 
defaming former Vice President Muhammad Hatta. Furthermore, on                   
25 November 1954, public prosecutor Dali Mutiara formally accused 
Aidit of violating articles 134, 207, 310 and 311 of the Criminal Code by 
insulting the honour of the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Muhammad Hatta. He made this accusation on the grounds of a 
statement issued by the Central Bureau of the PKI on 13 September 
calling upon members of the party to commemorate the Madiun Affair 
internally. This resulted in Aidit’s being tried on 24 February 1955.  
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In the trial, Aidit defended his statements about Madiun on the basis that 
the newspapers Pedoman, Abadi and Keng Po had been publishing very 
negative accounts of the communist role in Madiun. In response Aidit 
had made a statement on 13 September 1953 using the words 
“provocation”, “cruelties”, “served” (meaning serving the US 
imperialists), “bloodstained” and “heroism” to refer to the events.
90 
These words had apparently caused great offence, but Aidit defended 
their use, stating he did not intend to cause insult. Instead: 
 
We used the word provocation because we really meant 
provocation, we used the word cruelties of the Hatta, 
Sukiman and Nastir government because we are of the 
opinion that that government really was cruel; we said that 
the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir government served by 
unleashing civil war because, by unleashing civil war, they 
relay did “serve” their group and class; we said that the 
hands of the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir clique were 
bloodstained because we really meant that; we spoke of the 
heroism of the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir government in 
crushing the Communist and patriots because we really 
meant that the Hatta, Suukiman and Natsir government were 
indeed “heroes” in the eyes of their group and class.
91   
 
He clarifies that the 6th cabinet in his view was largely a Masyumi 
cabinet led by Mohamad Hatta. Aidit writes, “From the time of its 
formation on 29 January 1948 this cabinet pursued a completely 
Masyumi policy and the Madiun Provocation was the most important 
implementation of this policy, that is the policy or rounding up and 
murdering Communists, the policy which the Masyumi leaders still 
pursue right up to this day.”
92 Clearly the 1951 raids were still fresh in 
the party’s mind, and Aidit sought to emphasise these raids as part of a 
trend of persecution of the PKI. 
 
Aidit concludes his trial statement by claiming that Masyumi has long 
been celebrating 18 September  as a day or mourning and the PKI agrees 
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to this. Instead however this should be a day of mourning for victims of 
the left and for Musso, Sjarifuddin, Harjono, Wirono, as well as for 
“many more heroes of the people whose names will live forever in the 
hearts and minds of all Indonesian people with genuine patriotic feeling 
and with the blood of the people flowing in their veins.”
93 He continued: 
 
We must mourn every 18 September so that we may 
always remember that we must be vigilant and strong in 
the face of every provocation. We must mourn every 18 
September so that we may always remember that we do 
not want to be divided, and that we must guard our 
national unity as the apple of our eye.
94  
 
Here Aidit reframes Madiun as a time when the nation was fractured, an 
experience that he says must never be repeated. His emphasis on 
national unity also follows the PKI’s recent political stance closely. At 
the end of the trial, Aidit was initially sentenced to three months” jail 
time with six months” probation.  
 
In the time leading up to the 1955 elections, Masyumi frequently alluded 
to the PKI’s links to Moscow, reminded people of Madiun and tried to 
stress the antireligious position of the communists. One example of this 
is the April 10
th report in the Islamic magazine Hikmah, which claimed 
that Aidit planned to make Indonesia a satellite to the Soviet Union.
95 
The international plot theory was given more credence by events in 
neighbouring Southeast Asia. The PKI negotiated its credentials very 
carefully in this context. In November 1954, Aidit accepted Pancasila 
and the party tried hard not to appear anti-religious.
96 The PKI claimed it 
had 500,000 members by November 1954 and 1 million by February 
1956.
97 In 1954, several cabinet members attended the party congress 
and Sukarno sent his well-wishes. For Feith, this suggested that “the 
stigma of Madiun was being erased rapidly.”
98  
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Masyumi performed surprisingly badly in the 1955 elections, achieving 
only 57 out of 257 seats, mostly based on outer island support; the PKI, 
on the other hand, surprisingly achieved 39 seats. Between March 1956 
and March 1957, Ali Sastroamidjojo presided over another cabinet. This 
cabinet was PNI-Masyumi-based in part, in reaction to a sense of threat 
from the PKI felt by some regional PNI leaders.
99 In September 1955, 
the newspaper Suara Masyumi also attempted to remind Indonesians 
about the Madiun Revolt.
100
 
In 1957 the regional revolts in Sumatera, which several Masyumi 
members backed, escalated. The Sumatran rebellions, as George and 
Audrey Kahin have detailed, were another important flash point for the 
Cold War in Indonesia, where American intervention was direct.
101 The 
regional revolt began as a response to the perceived Java centrism of the 
government and was led by regional military commanders in Central, 
North and South Sumatra with the support of local politicians. In 
January Masyumi, which was equally perturbed by the pro-Java focus of 
the government, withdrew its members from the Ali cabinet. Prior to this 
in the People’s Representative Council, Masyumi leader Udin Sjamsudin 
had tried to obscure what was happening in Sumatera by bringing in 
issues related to Madiun.  
 
In response to these efforts, Aidit delivered an address to the Council on 
11 February 1957.
102 Through this speech, Aidit again hoped to publicly 
show that the Madiun Affair was a provocation by reactionary forces led 
by Hatta. Secondly, he hoped to highlight that the PRRI rebellion was 
something quite different from Madiun. The speech was clearly also a 
polemic against Masyumi’s comment that the PKI was a party that was 
rebellious by nature. 
 
In this speech, Aidit concurred that there were commonalities between 
the rebellion in Sumatra and the events of Madiun because both were 
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tied in to imperialist interests: American and Dutch. In the case of 
Sumatra, Aidit had more evidence to point to a definitive role played by 
the US. Aidit claimed, “The PKI is not afraid to talk about Madiun as it 
gives them the opportunity to speak of the injustice perpetrated against 
them. When the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and Masyumi seem like 
they are implicated in the events in Sumatra, do not bring up Madiun to 
hit the PKI with, for this is like slapping water in one’s own face (the 
faces of the PSI and Masyumi).”
103 Aidit also clearly stated the party 
line on armed rebellion: 
 
The PKI has stated over and over again – and has 
incorporated it also into its syllabus in party courses etc that 
we do not want a repeat of Madiun and that we will reach 
our political aims through the parliamentary road. So long as 
the PKI had its political rights guaranteed, we are prepared 
to play along with the political process, but clearly if we 
were faced with bayonets and bullets, we would not be 
baring our chests for the bullets and bayonets of the counter-
revolutionaries (to pierce us).
104
 
By the time of this statement in 1957, it was clear that the PKI was still 
working hard to erase the image of the party as rebellious. However, the 
outbreak of regional rebellions in Sumatra culminating in the February 
1958 declaration of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, which several Masyumi politicians backed, provided the PKI 
with a valuable means of rebutting Masyumi’s efforts to denigrate the 
party. 
 
By mid-June the Sumatra rebellion was crushed, and all associated 
including Hatta and Masyumi, who refused to condemn Masyumi 
members who supported the revolt, were discredited. One result of the 
rebellions and Sukarno’s statement about the need to bury the parties 
and move to an alternative political system was that all parties except the 
PKI lost much of their importance.
105 Feith notes that the PKI’s 
confidence grew when it came to light that there was Western support 
for the rebels. Top leaders condemned Western powers at this time, 
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especially the US, but by May–June Indonesia had achieved 
rapprochement  with USA.
106 The PKI received a major reprieve, 
however, with the banning of Masyumi and the PSI in August 1960 for 
their involvement in the rebellions.  
 
The army, Sukarno and the PKI were increasingly important after these 
rebellions and with the beginning of Guided Democracy in 1959.
107 The 
history wars between the PKI and former Masyumi supporters fell silent 
in this period due to the muzzle on Masyumi, yet there were also 
sections of the Indonesian military for whom Madiun cemented an 
enduring suspicion of communism. Chief amongst these people was 
Nasution, who rose to prominence beginning in the mid-1950s. In the 
early 1960s, Nasution also tried to use the memories of Madiun 
whenever he could to check communist influence. In 1964, for example, 
he worked with the former soldier Nugroho Notosusanto to quickly 
produce an army version of the Madiun Affair to counter a planned PKI 
history in which the Madiun Affair would be omitted.
108
 
On 30 September
  1965 members of an armed group kidnapped and 
killed six of the most senior army generals and disposed of their bodies 
in a disused well. As noted above, the army immediately blamed the 
coup attempts on the PKI, but it also set about spreading stories of the 
alleged barbarity of the PKI. In this context it did not take long for some 
Islamic groups to resurrect memories of the cruelty of the PKI in 
Madiun as a means of consolidating support for crushing the 
communists in 1965–1966. Soerasto Sastrosoewignjo, a member of the 
modernist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, wrote in the Jakarta 
daily Mertjusuar:   
 
Puppet master, how many times have you practiced your craft to 
stab our revolution from behind? In 1948 in the midst of the 
armed revolution a shameful and accursed treachery was 
perpetrated. How many thousands, tens of thousands, and 
hundreds of thousand patriotic folk, of religious leaders, and true 
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nationalists fell victims in that famous Madiun Affair of yours? 
Mass burials in disused wells are no innovation for you!
109
 
Immediate assertions were thus made regarding the alleged brutality of 
the communists against the Muslims in 1948, as further evidence that 
they must have been behind the murder of the generals in the coup 
attempt. Several respondents from the traditional Islamic organisation 
Nahdlatul Ulama in Java have also claimed in interviews since the 
1965–1966 killings that Madiun was very much on their minds after the 
coup and that this memory worked to reinforce a belief in 1965–1966 
that the possible response was to kill Communists or to be killed by 
them.
110 In the early New Order period, some triumphalist publications 
concerning Madiun began to appear to reinforce the view that 1948 was 
the first communist coup attempt.
111 In 1969 the Masyumi paper Harian 
Abadi called again for 18 September to be declared a National Day of 
Mourning.
112 By this stage approximately half a million Indonesians, 
mostly those affiliated with the PKI, had been killed by the military and 
religious vigilantes, and hundreds of thousands more had been 
imprisoned. 
Several decades later, as non-government organisations and the 
government began to pay more attention to human rights abuses, 
histories of Madiun again appeared. In 1990 Agus Sunyoto, historian 
and former head of the Nahdlatul Ulama-linked youth group Ansor in 
East Java, published The Pits of Slaughter: The PKI’s Schemes in 
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Madiun.
113 Written together with Maksum and A. Zainuddin, the book 
highlights “communist” brutality related to the Madiun Affair.
114 Soe 
Hok Gie’s more balanced 1969 thesis on Madiun was also published in 
Indonesia in 1997 for the first time.  
 
Since the fall of Suharto, there has been far greater openness to re-
examining the 1965 killings. The prominent Nahdlatul Ulama religious 
leader Yusuf Hasyim has, however, tried to resist this process by 
reviving memories of Madiun. Yusuf Hasyim narrowly escaped the 
revenge of Pesindo troops in 1948, and in 1965–66 he participated in 
and directed killing campaigns in Java as a leader in the armed militia 
Banser. Until his death in 2006, he  frequently tried to remind 
Indonesians of “communist cruelty” in the Madiun Affair of 1948. In 
2001, for example, Yusuf Hasyim organised a photographic exhibition 
in Jakarta detailing the cruelty of communists in 1948 and 1965 in 
addition to communist cruelty in other countries. The exhibition was 
repeated in 2003.
115 Then in 2004, he hosted a national dialogue 
between ulama and those who identified themselves as families of 
victims of the communists both in Madiun in 1948 and in 1965.
116 The 
exhibitions and dialogue were intended to stem any tide of sympathy 
towards victims of the post-coup violence and to prevent concessions to 
them. By reviving memories of Madiun, he thus tried to legitimise the 
1965–1966 killings. Since the killings, it has become even more 
important for those linked to them to revive memories of communist 
violence in 1948, particularly in the context of growing attention to the 
human rights violations in                         1965–1966. The events of 
1948 have thus continued to reverberate in Indonesia until this day. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The year 1948 was, I have argued, a flash point in the Cold War for 
Indonesia. For the two superpowers, it was a year in which the 
Americans felt they had gained a real ally and in which the Soviets had 
effectively lost one battle. This was not, however, an enduring alliance. 
By examining the events of 1948 in Indonesia purely from the point of 
view of the superpowers, we miss an opportunity to assess the enduring 
significance of 1948 for Cold War fractures within Indonesia.   
 
As I have argued, the events of 1948 had other, more subtle and lasting 
effects that shaped positions in the Cold War within Indonesia. While 
fleeing Republican troops, Peindo members killed approximately one 
hundred people. Memories of this violence were kept alive and passed 
down across generations within Islamic circles. They also became a key 
reference point in the competition between the PKI and Masyumi to win 
over Indonesians in the 1950s.  
 
Madiun was a significant scar for the PKI, and for many years the party 
remained vigilant in guarding against any form of provocation. The PKI 
continually emphasised its own victimhood in this episode, claiming that 
in fact this was only a local action blown completely out of proportion. 
More than anything, the events of 1948 worked to cement existing 
antagonisms between the PKI and Islamic groups. This antagonism also 
played a part in the violence of 1965–1966. Although the Cold War has 
ended, there are on-going motives today for upholding the orthodox 
view in Indonesia of Madiun as a PKI revolt. 
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